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UMG RECORDINGS, INC. V. VEOH NETWORKS,
INC.:
THE FUTURE OF INVESTOR LIABILITY FOR
USER-GENERATED CONTENT
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the fame and subsequent explosive demise of Napster as
an illicit peer-to-peer file sharing phenomenon, global use of the
internet for media storage and retrieval has continued to
skyrocket.' Never far from the front page, intellectual property
issues in web media content were brought once again to the
forefront of the nation's consciousness with Viacom and Google's
recent battle over YouTube content.2  As the online market
continues to expand, and websites hosting user-generated content
continue to crop up at a rate surpassed only by the increasing
numbers of users, intellectual property liability is becoming a
growing concern for those providing users the online space with
which to store and share their media.
Recently, in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc.,' the
Central District of California in the Ninth Circuit made a statement
about the limits of liability for investors. This note will advocate
1. See generally Researchers to Build Peer-to-Peer Storage Monsters, CNET
NEWS, http://news.cnet.com/Researchers-to-build-peer-to-peer-storage-monsters
/2009-1001_3-250766.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2010) ("[C]ompanies and
colleges are anticipating that in the not-too-distant future, bandwidth advances
could expand exponentially the size and complexity of applications and services
that consumers will expect to run over the Web.").
2. Greg Sandoval, Viacom, YouTube Inch Toward Courtroom Showdown,
CNET NEWS, Jan. 7, 2010, http://news.cnet.com/8301-31001_3-10429617-261
.html ("Viacom accuses YouTube of encouraging copyright and profiting when
users upload unauthorized TV and movie clips. That the two sides are preparing
for summary judgment is a sign that the nearly 3-year-old and closely-watched
copyright fight is finally nearing some kind of closure.") (emphasis added).
3. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc. (Veoh IV), No. CV 07-
5744 AIM (AJWx), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70553 (C.D. Cal. May 5, 2009);
see also UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc. (Veoh III), No. CV 07-
5744 AHM (AJWx), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14955 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2009).
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that, while the legal support behind that statement could be
stronger, continuing to limit liability for investors is the correct
decision for a number of policy reasons. However, because policy
is always open to varying interpretations, Congress should amend
existing copyright law in order to create a more predictable
investment environment in terms of infringement liability.
Part II of this article covers the background leading up to UMG
v. Veoh, including: (a) a foray into the various theories of
secondary copyright infringement liability; (b) a discussion of the
current issues for those who invest in websites hosting user-
generated content, with a brief description and history of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act's "safe harbor" provisions; and
(c) a discussion of the Napster-Grokster-Aimster trilogy and
resulting developments in the changing landscape of user-
generated content. Part III features a brief history of the legal
skirmishes between Universal Music Group and Veoh, followed
by a summary of the most recent substantive investor-related
opinion in UMG v. Veoh; and Part IV will analyze the Veoh
opinion in light of the recent history of litigation involving
websites hosting user-generated content and public policy.
Finally, Part V of this article will forecast the future of investor
liability for websites hosting user-generated content and endorse
the need for further Congressional consideration of the investor
liability question in the form of an amendment to the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Theories of Secondary Liability
1. Contributory Infringement Liability
Contributory infringement liability is derived from the concept
of enterprise liability in tort law.4 The accepted standard for
4. See Demetriades v. Kaufman, 690 F. Supp. 289, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("In
delineating the contours of this third-party liability, and because copyright is
76
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contributory infringement dictates that liability will arise if the
defendant "(1) has knowledge of the infringing conduct and (2)
'induces, causes, or materially contributes to the infringing
conduct." There are two general types of actions that yield such
liability: "(a) personal conduct that forms part of or furthers the
infringement; or (b) the contribution of machinery or goods that
provide the means to infringe."6
Recently, A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (Napster II)'
demonstrated that a system operator is liable for the infringing
material put on his system by others only when he learns about
specific infringing material. Without actual or constructive
knowledge of the specific infringing activities, the system operator
"cannot be liable for contributory infringement merely because the
structure of the system allows for the exchange of copyrighted
material."'
2. Vicarious Infringement Liability
This rationale for holding a party liable for another's infringing
acts has roots in the doctrine of respondeat superior.9 Modem
cases such as Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.0 show that
vicarious liability is no longer confined to the traditional limits of
analogous to a species of tort, 'common law concepts of tort liability are
relevant in fixing the scope of the statutory copyright remedy . . . ."' (quoting
Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399,
403 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (Weinfeld, J.))).
5. Darrin Keith Henning, "The Big Chill": The Supreme Court Adopts an
Inducement Standard for Third-Party Copyright Infringement Liability, Leaving
Innovation in the Cold. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,
125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005), 29 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 165, 182 (2006)
(quoting Gershwin Pub'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d
1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
6. Eric J. Schwartz, Outline of Domestic Copyright Law, 527 PLI/Pat 293,
314 (1998).
7. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (Napster II), 239 F.3d 1004, 1021 (9th
Cir. 2001).
8. Id.; see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 442-43 (1983).
9. See Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261-62 (9th Cir. 1996).
10. Id.
2010] 77
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respondeat superior." A defendant is vicariously liable after
direct infringement takes place when that defendant "(1) had 'the
right and ability to supervise the infringing activity,' and (2) had
an obvious and direct financial interest in such activities."l 2
Neither intent to infringe, nor knowledge of infringement, is
required. 3
In Fonovisa, the defendant, Cherry Auction, operated a flea
market, or "swap meet," in which third-party vendors sold
counterfeit copies of music, infringing the plaintiffs copyrights
and trademarks. 4 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of Fonovisa's
complaint, finding, inter alia, that Cherry Auction would likely be
held liable under the doctrine of vicarious liability, both for having
a right to supervise its vendors - due to Cherry Auction's broad
contractual right to police its vendors - and for knowingly
benefitting from its vendors' infringement." While Cherry
Auction did not obtain a direct commission from the vendors'
receipts, "the sale of pirated recordings at the Cherry Auction swap
meet was a 'draw' for customers," from which Cherry Auction
derived concession sales, as well as admission and parking fees. 6
Thus, Fonovisa demonstrates that, although the right and ability
to supervise may be most apparent in the employer-employee
relationship, it can extend to other supervisory relationships when
the supervisory and financial interest elements are fulfilled." The
policy behind vicarious liability is to prevent genuine infringers
from hiding behind "dummy" entities; however, the actual
standard of oversight required to create liability in these cases does
not require such a high level of intent.'" As the Second Circuit
11. Henning, supra note 5, at 179.
12. Id. at 180.
13. See CoStar Group v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 2004).
14. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 261.
15. Id. at 263.
16. Id.
17. Henning, supra note 7, at 181.
18. See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. Inc., v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 309
(2d Cir. 1963). The Second Circuit reached the conclusion that "in many cases,
the party found strictly liable is in a position to police the conduct of the
'primary' infringer" adding "[w]ere we to hold otherwise, we might foresee the
78
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once articulated in the context of the use of copyrighted music at a
dance hall, vicarious liability can be found "whether or not the
proprietor has knowledge of the compositions to be played or any
control over their selection."19
This application of this policy was demonstrated by the Ninth
Circuit in Napster 11, when the court concluded that the file-
sharing company Napster was vicariously liable for its users'
infringement because it met the classical elements for vicarious
liability: (1) Napster, Inc.'s users directly infringed the copyrights;
(2) Napster had the right and ability to supervise its users' conduct
and failed to do so; and (3) Napster's "future revenue was directly
dependent upon increases in user base."2 0 Thus, as Napster
derived no significant revenue from its business model, it appears
that, under Napster II, the promise of future revenue is an adequate
benefit upon which to base the imposition vicarious liability.2 1
3. Inducement to Infringement Liability
A third form of secondary liability was introduced in Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,22 when the United
States Supreme Court adopted an inducement test for contributory
infringement liability, declaring that, "one who distributes a device
with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as
shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster
infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by
third parties."23 In order to create this new rule, the Court looked
to patent law for guidance and found a suitable solution in the
prospect -- not wholly unreal -- of large chain and department stores
establishing 'dummy' concessions and shielding their own eyes from the
possibility of copyright infringement, thus creating a buffer against liability
while reaping the proceeds of infringement". Id.
19. Id. at 307.
20. Napster II, 239 F.3d 1004, 1023-24 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that the
element of financial benefit can be proven with infringement that "enhances the
attractiveness of a venue" (citing Fonovisa, 76 F.3d 259, 263-64 (9th Cir.
1996))).
21. Henning supra note 5, at 182.
22. 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
23. Id. at 936-37.
2010] 79
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patent law theory of intentional inducement of infringement
liability.24 The Court explained that, under the theory of
intentional inducement, a party is liable when it engages in
"purposeful, culpable expression and conduct" that promotes and
encourages the infringing uses of its product, not when it has
"mere knowledge" of infringement.25 Intent can be derived from
"active steps . . . taken to encourage direct infringement," such as
advertising.2 6
As the need has arisen, courts have continued to refine the
standards for assessing secondary liability in copyright cases, and
Congress has pursued statutory codification of many standards.
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act is an example of one such
Congressional action.
B. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act
Congress enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA)27 in 1998 in response to the increased availability of
illegal file-sharing methods on the web and the unprecedented
legal issues associated with the litigation begotten by such
methods.28 The two principal reasons the DMCA was promulgated
were: (1) to appease copyright owners' fears that their material
would be spread across the entire digital community; and (2) to
affirm the ratification of the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) treaties.
Title II of the DMCA, the "Online Copyright Infringement
Liability Limitation Act," ' addresses the liability of Internet
24. Id. at 936.
25. Id. at 937.
26. Id. at 936 (quoting Oak Indus., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 697 F. Supp.
988, 992 (N.D. Ill. 1988)).
27. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 17, 28, and 35 U.S.C.).
28. Justin D. Fitzdam, Note, Private Enforcement of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act: Effective without Government Intervention, 90 CORNELL L. REV.
1085, 1089 (2005).
29. Id.
30. Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act, Title 1I of the
DMCA, 112 Stat. 2877 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000)).
80
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Service Providers (ISPs) for copyright infringement.' By acting
in accordance with certain prerequisites, an ISP will avoid liability
for monetary damages for various copyright infringement claims.32
ISP compliance with the Act further limits equitable and injunctive
relief."
Title II specifically enumerates four limitations on ISP liability.
These four parts of Section 512 are commonly referred to as the
"DMCA Safe Harbor Provisions."34 Section 512(a) applies to ISP
liability for the transmission of infringing material over its
network.35 Section 512(b) covers liability for system caching,
which refers to "the intermediate and temporary storage of
material on a system or network" controlled by the ISP.36 Section
512(c) addresses liability for copyrighted information that "resides
on a system or network" controlled by the ISP.37 Finally, section
512(d) deals with liability for providing information location tools,
such as directories, indices, references, pointers, or hypertext
links."
To qualify for these safe harbor provisions, the ISP must have a
policy for terminating repeat offenders, and must notify account
holders of this policy." The ISP also must not interfere with
standard technical measures used by copyright owners to identify
or protect copyrighted works.40 Some of the specific safe harbors
have additional requirements. For example, to be free from
liability under sections 512(c) and 512(d), the ISP cannot have
actual knowledge of the infringement or be "aware of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent."4 ' In
31. Fitzdam, supra note 28, at 1089.
32. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000).
33. Id. § 512(j).
34. See, e.g. Viacom Int'l v. Youtube, No. 07 civ. 2103, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 62829, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2010); 95 U.S.P.Q.2d 1766 (S.D.N.Y.
2010).
35. Id. § 512(a).
36. Id. § 512(b)(1).
37. Id. § 512(c).
38. Id. § 512(d).
39. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A) (2000).
40. Id. § 512(i)(1)(B).
41. Id. §§ 512(c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii), (d)(1)(A)-(B).
2010] 8 1
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addition, the ISP must not receive direct financial benefits from the
infringing activity.42 Further, to avoid liability under sections
512(b), 512(c), and 512(d), upon receiving notice, the ISP must
respond "expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the
material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of
infringing activity."43 Shortly after its adoption in 1998, a number
of courts across the country began to rely on the DMCA as file-
sharing sites such as Napster sprang up.
C. The Napster-Grokster-Aimster Trilogy
In the fall of 1998, Northeastern University freshman Shawn
Fanning developed MusicShare, the peer-to-peer file-sharing
software that was publicly released in the summer of 1999 and
formed the basis of Napster, Inc." Over fifty million people were
using MusicShare by the time the Ninth Circuit issued its
injunction.45 "Faced with a vast amount of allegedly infringing
activity taking place by the software's users, A&M Records and
seventeen other record companies sued Napster for vicarious and
contributory copyright infringement liability in December 1999 . .
,,46
The Northern District of California concluded "that facilitating
the unauthorized exchange of copyrighted music was a central part
of Napster, Inc.'s business strategy from the inception."47  The
court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction
and enjoined Napster from operating as a facilitator of copyrighted
music exchange. 48  The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the "district court's conclusion that plaintiffs had
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their
contributory copyright infringement claim."49  The court further
42. Id. §§ 512(c)(1)(B), (d)(2).
43. Id. §§ 512(b)(2)(E), (c)(1)(C), (d)(3).
44. Henning supra note 5, at 167-68.
45. Id. at 168.
46. Id. at 169 (citing A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (Napster 1), 114 F.
Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
47. Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 918.
48. Id. at 927.
49. Napster II, 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001).
82
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concluded that Napster had materially contributed to its users'
infringing activities by providing and monitoring the "site and
facilities" for direct infringement."o A number of peer-to-peer file-
sharing software companies rushed to fill the file-sharing void left
by the fallen Napster, and studios and media conglomerates
hastened to follow in the successful legal footsteps of A&M
Records and its peers.
Grokster was one such peer-to-peer file-sharing software
company. In Grokster , a bevy of entertainment companies jointly
filed a complaint against Grokster for contributory and vicarious
copyright infringement.5 ' The entertainment plaintiffs alleged that,
like Napster before it, Grokster distributed peer-to-peer file-
sharing software to end-users who then employed the software to
illegally share the plaintiffs' copyrighted material with others.52
The litigation went through a number of iterations, until the United
States Supreme Court unanimously vacated the Ninth Circuit's
judgment in its 2005 decision. .5 The decision upheld a grant of
partial summary judgment in favor of Respondents, Grokster and
StreamCast.54 In doing so, the Court adopted an inducement
liability rule that holds the distributor of a product contributorily
liable for users' infringing activities when the distributor promotes
the use of the product to infringe copyrights-as demonstrated by
clear expression or affirmative steps to cultivate infringement-
regardless of the product's lawful uses.
In In re Aimster Copyright Litigation,56 the Seventh Circuit
employed five factors to gauge contributory copyright liability: (1)
the ongoing relationship between the vendor and the users; (2) the
balance between infringing and noninfringing uses; (3) any willful
blindness on the part of the vendor; (4) the cost to the vendor to
50. Id. ("[W]ithout the support services defendant provides, Napster users
could not find and download the music they want with the ease of which
defendant boasts." (quoting Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 919-20).
51. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. 545 U.S. 913, 941 (2005); see also
Henning, supra note 5, at 167.
52. Henning, supra note 5, at 167.
53. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 941.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 936-37.
56. 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
832010]
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avoid the infringement; and (5) the probability of actual
noninfringing uses." In concluding that, in copyright law, "willful
blindness is knowledge," Judge Posner treated the encryption built
into Aimster's system as purposeful shielding from the
infringement Aimster knew to be occurring." Thus Judge Posner
adopted a "knowledge rule" that holds distributors liable if they
knew or should have known of infringing activity.59 The court
ultimately affirmed an injunction against Aimster, concluding that
at trial Aimster would likely be liable for contributory
infringement.60
While the litigious history of secondary liability had been
expanding, the three concepts of secondary copyright liability had
never been applied on a tertiary level when UMG v. Veoh was
decided.
III. SUBJECT OPINION: UMG RECORDINGS, INC. V. VEOH
NETWORKS, INC.
A. Facts
Universal Music Group (UMG) is a company comprised of two
core businesses: recorded music and music publishing."' "The
company discovers, develops, markets, and distributes recorded
music through a network of subsidiaries, joint ventures and
licensees in 77 countries, representing 98% of the music market."62
UMG also sells, distributes, and licenses music videos, DVD
products, and recordings.63 UMG's music publishing company,
Universal Music Publishing Group, owns and acquires rights to
57. Andrew J. Lee, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. & In re Aimster
Litigation: A Study of Secondary Copyright Liability in the Peer-to-Peer
Context, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 485, 495-96 (2005).
58. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d at 650.
59. Id. (emphasis added).
60. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d at 653.
61. See generally Universal Music Group - Overview, http://new.umusic.
com/overview.aspx (last visited Nov. 30, 2010).
62. Id.
63. Id.
84
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musical compositions and licenses them for use in recordings,
films, and advertisements.'
Veoh is an online video service that gives users with a
broadband connection free access to a substantial amount of TV
and film studio content, independent productions, and user-
generated videos on the Web." Content ranges from series on
CBS, ABC, and MTV Networks to Warner Bros., Sony Pictures
and ESPN, to "your favorite YouTube clips."66 Veoh's search
capabilities and recommendations engine help users find videos
that they choose to search for as well as discover recommended
content based on user preferences.6 7
B. Procedural History
On August 9, 2007, Veoh Networks, Inc. commenced a
declaratory judgment action against UMG Recordings and other
UMG-affiliated companies seeking a declaration of non-
infringement of UMG's copyrights, principally under § 512(c) of
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).6 8 The United
States District Court for the Southern District of California granted
UMG's motion to dismiss the complaint, citing the lack of an
adequately defined controversy to support federal jurisdiction.69
The court noted that Veoh's lack of specificity about what
copyrights UMG owned and which of Veoh's material was
infringing meant that Veoh was essentially seeking to preempt any
possible future suits for infringement of any of UMG's materials-
a rather far-reaching holding in light of the increasing probability
of infringement on the internet.' However, Veoh's complaint was
64. Id.
65. See generally Veoh - About Veoh, http://www.veoh.com/corporate/
aboutus (last visited Nov. 30, 2010).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Veoh Networks, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc. (Veoh 1), 522 F. Supp. 2d
1265, 1268 (S.D. Cal. 2007).
69. Id. at 1268-69.
70. Id. at 1269-70. (The court further noted that "because Plaintiff does not
reference any specific copyright, even by way of example, the relief requested
would necessarily take the form of an advisory opinion. Succinctly, the Court
2010] 85
11
Brodzinski: UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc.: The Future of Invest
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & IPLAW [Vol. XXI:75
dismissed without prejudice-an acknowledgement by the court of
the likely continuation of litigation between UMG and Veoh."
Indeed, Veoh executives' fears of a future infringement suit
from UMG were substantiated almost immediately when UMG
sued Veoh for direct, contributory, and vicarious copyright
infringement, and for inducement to copyright infringement in
early September 2007.72 Veoh responded by asserting an
affirmative defense under the DMCA's "safe harbor" provisions.73
UMG filed for partial summary judgment on the issue that Veoh
was not entitled to an affirmative defense under one of the safe
harbors, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(c). 74 The defense at issue
precluded imposing monetary liability on a "service provider ...
for infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the
direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network
controlled or operated by or for the service provider," but only if
the service provider fulfills a number of statutory requirements.
UMG challenged four specific software functions performed by
Veoh as infringing its copyrights: "(1) automatically creating
'Flash-formatted' copies of video files uploaded by users; (2)
automatically creating copies of uploaded video files that are
comprised of smaller 'chunks' of the original file; (3) allowing
users to access uploaded videos via a technology called
'streaming;' and (4) allowing users to access uploaded videos by
downloading whole video files."76 The California district court
concluded that each of these functions was "narrowly directed
toward providing access to material stored at the direction of
users," and affected only the form, and not the content, of the
videos." The court thus denied UMG's motion for partial
summary judgment on Veoh's safe harbor defense in December
cannot determine whether a safe harbor for copyright infringement exists
without knowing which rights are at stake.").
71. Id. at 1270.
72. Veoh III, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14955, at *2.
73. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc. (Veoh H), 620 F. Supp. 2d
1081, 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1083.
77. Id. at 1092.
86
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2008.8
UMG made short work of continuing its litigious saga with
Veoh, and filed its First Amended Complaint (FAC) on August 26,
2008, naming three of Veoh's investors as defendants ("Investor
Defendants") on all of the secondary liability theories included in
the original complaint against Veoh.79
C. Motion to Dismiss UMG's First Amended Complaint
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California granted Veoh's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss UMG's
FAC on February 2, 2009.o The court considered each of UMG's
theories of liability as separate issues, the first being whether the
investor defendants were liable for contributory copyright
infringement." The second issue was whether the investor
defendants were vicariously liable for copyright infringement,82
and the third issue was whether the investor defendants were liable
for inducing copyright infringement.83
1. The District Court's Analysis in Veoh III
In its analysis, the court noted that all of the causes of action
against the Investor Defendants were based on theories of
secondary liability premised on thus far unproven allegations that
Veoh and its users directly infringed UMG's copyrighted works.84
The Court went on to analyze each theory of secondary liability
separately."
78. Id.
79. Veoh III, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14955, at *2. The original complaint
alleged the defendants were liable for contributory and vicarious copyright
infringement, as well as inducement of copyright infringement. Veoh II, 620 F.
Supp. 2d 1081, 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
80. Veoh III, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14955, at *19.
81. Id. at *8-9.
82. Id. at *14-17.
83. Id. at *17-18.
84. Id. at *8.
85. Id. at *9-19.
2010] 87
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a. Contributory Copyright Infringement
The Court cited the rule from Napster that "[t]o be liable for
contributory copyright, the defendant must have knowledge or
reason to have knowledge of direct infringement and must provide
material assistance to the infringer."" According to the court, the
FAC alleged that the Investor Defendants had actual knowledge of
direct infringement, but did not sufficiently allege that they gave
material assistance in achieving it." Essentially, UMG attempted
unsuccessfully to allege that the Investor Defendants sought and
obtained control of Veoh "knowing full well that the site displayed
and distributed copyrighted works without appropriate licenses,
and knowing full well that Veoh's users used Veoh to engage in
massive copyright infringement."" However, Judge A. Howard
Matz was unpersuaded by this argument, citing UMG's lack of
specific allegations of the Investors' significant involvement in
Veoh's workings.89
Judge Matz was not convinced by UMG's various assertions
regarding the Investor Defendants' control over the company as
members of the board of directors, or UMG's attempts to
analogize Veoh to UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Bertelsmann AG, et
al.," in which investors in Napster were held liable for
contributory copyright infringement." In holding that there were
no sufficient allegations of contributory copyright infringement in
the present case, the Judge distinguished Bertelsmann, noting that
in that case, Bertelsmann was Napster's "only available source of
funding," Napster had already been found guilty of copyright
infringement, and Senior Bertelsmann management directed
Napster to stay operational while infringing in order to preserve its
86. Veoh III, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14955, at *9 (emphasis added)
("Traditionally, 'one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces,
causes, or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be
held liable as a 'contributory' infringer." (quoting A & M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019-20 (9th Cir. 2001)
87. Veoh III, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14955, at *9-10.
88. Id. at *9 (citing UMG's First Am. Compl. 5, Aug. 26, 2008).
89. Veoh III, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14955, at *10.
90. 222 F.R.D. 408 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
91. Veoh III, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14955, at *11-12.
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customer base.92
b. Vicarious Copyright Infringement
The court took its cue from Napster again, stating that "[a] party
may be vicariously liable if it has the right and ability to supervise
the infringing activity, and has a direct financial interest in the
infringing activities."93 Here, the court did not address whether the
FAC sufficiently alleged that Investor Defendants had the right
and ability to supervise Veoh's directly infringing conduct,
because the court found that UMG failed to establish that the
Investor Defendants had a direct financial interest in the allegedly
infringing activities.9
UMG cited Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.," as its only
binding authority; however, in that case, the revenue from the flea-
market of infringing goods flowed directly from customers to the
flea-market's owners.9 6 In contrast, the court in Veoh concluded
that any alleged financial benefit the Investor Defendants might
someday hope to obtain would not come directly from Veoh's
users or from Veoh's advertisers, but rather from a potential future
sale of Investors' stock in the company." Since the financial
benefit was "too far removed to be considered a 'direct' financial
interest," the court held that allegations of vicarious copyright
infringement were insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss."
c. Inducement to Infringe Copyright
The inducement to infringe copyright standard was first
articulated in Grokster, and was used again by the court in Veoh
III: "Inducement to infringe copyright requires distribution of a
92. Id. at *12 (citing UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Bertelsmann AG, 222 F.R.D.
408, 412-13 (N.D. Cal. 2004)).
93. Veoh III, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14955, at *14 (quoting Napster, 239
F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001)).
94. Veoh III, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14955, at *14.
95. 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
96. Veoh III, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14955, at *15.
97. Id. at* 17.
98. Id.
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device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright,
as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to
foster infringement."" Regarding this theory of secondary
liability, Judge Matz found that UMG failed to allege that the
Investors had encouraged infringement by Veoh or by Veoh's
users at all.'o Furthermore, the court pointed out once again that
Veoh had yet to be found liable for copyright infringement."0 '
Judge Matz granted the Investor Defendants' motion to dismiss
without prejudice, but with a stem warning that should UMG
choose to file a Second Amended Complaint, it "should reflect
carefully what is likely to result if [it does] so. The Court's
existing scheduling requirements and the near-certain additional
costs and complications that will flow from attempting to go after
deep pockets whose potential liability could entail vexing issues of
corporate governance caution that 'less may be more."" 02
D. Motion to Dismiss UMG's Second Amended Complaint
True to the warning concluding his previous opinion, Judge A.
Howard Matz considered and dismissed UMG's Second Amended
Complaint (SAC) as efficiently as he did their first.'
1. New Allegations Against Investor Defendants
The court began its analysis by asserting that it was
incorporating its opinion granting the dismissal of the FAC, and
reviewing the allegations in order to highlight the similarities
between the FAC and the SAC.'" After reviewing his prior
opinion, Judge Matz briefly summarized the new allegations
against the Investor Defendants, which can be summed up as: (1)
investors had extensive control over Veoh; (2) investors were the
99. Id. at *17-18 (citing Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 936-37, (2005)).
100. Veoh III, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14955, at *18.
101. Id.
102. Id. at*19.
103. Veoh IV, No. CV 07-5744 AHM (AJWx), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
70553, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 5, 2009).
104. Id. at *4-5.
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"public face" of Veoh; (3) investors considered and were aware of
copyright matters; (4) investors participated in decisions to eschew
filtering technology; (5) investors participated in the decision not
to initiate a manual filtering policy; (6) investors had actual
knowledge of direct infringement; (6) and investors decided to
allow infringing traffic to attract users to the site.1o5
The court took the time to discuss each new allegation
individually, but in the end asserted that:
[T]hey boil down to allegations that overlap almost
entirely with the allegations of the FAC: the
Investor Defendants knew that infringing activity
was occurring .on Veoh's site; as board members
and financial supporters of Veoh the Investor
Defendants could have done more to prevent this
activity, such as implementing filtering software or
hiring employees to ferret out infringing content;
and the Investor Defendants hoped to eventually
profit from their investment in Veoh, and thus
sought to attract more users to Veoh by providing
funding and by implementing policies that
"facilitated more infringement." 06
The court then evaluated each of UMG's allegations in relation
to the three theories of secondary liability under which Investor
Defendants were being sued-all the while noting with distaste the
similarities to the FAC. o'
2. The District Court's Analysis in Veoh II
a. Contributory Copyright Infringement
UMG again relied on Fonovisa in the SAC, this time asserting
that Investor Defendants provided the "site and facilities" for
105. Id. at *5-13.
106. Id. at *12-13.
107. Id. at* *15-28.
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direct infringement.'" Fonovisa held that "providing the site and
facilities for known infringing activity is sufficient to establish
contributory liability."'09 "Site and facilities" as articulated by the
Fonovisa court included "space, utilities, parking, advertising,
plumbing, and customers" for defendants' infringing flea-market,
and was extended to the domain of the internet in Napster."o The
Ninth Circuit in Napster held that the defendant provided the "site
and facilities" for direct infringement because it operated "an
integrated service designed to enable users to locate and download
MP3 music files."" Judge Matz distinguished Veoh's situation,
asserting that the "site and facilities" analysis did not apply
because Veoh's Investors merely provided funding." 2
b. Vicarious Copyright Infringement
The Court held in its previous opinion that it did not need to
address the question of Investor Defendants' right and ability to
supervise the infringing activity because the FAC failed to allege
that the Investor Defendants had a direct financial interest in the
infringing activities, and the SAC did not do much to supplement
the FAC in that regard."'
c. Inducement to Copyright Infringement
The court was again unimpressed with any extra boost the new
allegations against Investor Defendants were supposed to provide
to UMG's claims that they induced anyone to infringe UMG's
copyrights."4  Judge Matz pointed out that there were no
allegations present in the SAC that defendants, as either Investors
or Board members, "distributed" any device, and therefore he
108. Id. at * 17 (relying on the "site and facilities" test that was established in
the Ninth Circuit (citing Fonovisa, 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996)).
109. Veoh IV, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70553, at *17.
110. Id. at *17-18 (citing Napster, 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001)).
111. Veoh IV, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70553, at *18 (quoting Napster, 239
F.3d at 1022).
112. Veoh IV, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70553, at *20.
113. Id. at *25.
114. Id. at *27.
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could not find them liable for inducement to copyright
infringement."'
In his conclusion, Judge Matz was careful to pronounce that his
decision was a result not only of defects in UMG's SAC, but that
"[i]n the absence of clear precedent, this Court is not willing to
expand the scope of copyright liability in a manner that presents a
substantial risk of upending well-established concepts of corporate
governance"."' He goes on to point out that secondary copyright
liability principles are important, however, UMG's proposed
expansion of those principles would weaken the corporate form,
which is meant to protect investors from liability."' Lastly, Judge
Matz brings home the public policy point that seems to be a large
factor in his decision: "[t]he vast and rapid expansion of software
technology in telecommunications is generally beneficial to our
economy and society, and we should not erect obstacles to that
growth in the absence of sound legal and policy-based reasons.""'
IV. ANALYSIS
In the conclusion of his last substantive opinion on the subject,l 9
115. Id. (explaining that inducement to infringe copyright requires
"distribution of a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster
infringement." (quoting Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 936-37 (2005) (emphasis
added)).
116. Id. at *28 (emphasis added).
117. Id.
118. Veoh IV, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70553, at *29.
119. Judge Matz issued two subsequent procedural opinions. First, he denied
Investor Defendants' motion for costs and fees because plaintiffs' claims were
not frivolous as "[t]here was no clear appellate precedent upholding (or
rejecting, for that matter) the validity of UMG's claims." UMG Recordings, Inc.
v. Veoh Networks, Inc., No. CV 07-5744 AHM (AJWx), 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9082 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2010). Second, he denied Veoh's motion for
costs and fees, after citing the same lack of frivolousness that was found in
Investor Defendants' motion, and discussing the policy considerations that
"what UMG sought to do here was consistent with the kind of vigorous
advocacy that can lead to clarification and more predictable application of
principles of secondary copyright liability, [additionally,] Veoh advanced a
meritorious defense and awarding it fees would encourage it (and other
2010] 93
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Judge Matz did not reiterate any of his earlier legal conclusions
regarding Veoh investors' alleged contributory infringement,'2 0 but
instead chose to focus almost entirely on policy justifications for
his ruling.12' Judge Matz's policy arguments are indeed sound, and
the court reached the correct policy decision; however, that
decision was not adequately supported with law. This is a problem
that will continue to occur until a clear line marking the bounds of
secondary and tertiary copyright liability is drawn, either by the
Supreme Court or Congress-preferably the latter.
A. Law and Precedent
In Veoh, Judge Matz did not offer a concrete legal analysis of
the issues presented so much as a scattered list of various loosely-
related and quickly presented arguments.'22 In his assessment of
the contributory copyright liability allegations, Judge Matz
focused on the idea that the Investor Defendants only provided
funding for Veoh and declared that it would be far too over-
inclusive to allow liability to attach to any defendants who provide
"any essential element of a business-from electricity to courier
service."l2 However, this exaggerated assertion makes light of the
fact that Veoh Investors not only funded Veoh's operations but
also sat on the board of directors and helped make decisions about
the direction the company would take.'24 Being mere board
members is perhaps not, in the end, a substantial enough source of
defendants) to litigate such important defenses 'to the same extent that
plaintiffs are encouraged to litigate meritorious claims of infringement."' UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., No. CV 07-5744 AHM (AJWx), 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44430, Copy. L. Rep. (CCH) P29902 at *6 (C.D. Cal. April 6,
2010) (citation omitted).
120. Veoh III, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14955, at *9-13.
121. Veoh IV, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70553, at *28-9.
122. In Judge Matz's defense, there were a high number of allegations, none
of which seem to have been backed by a substantial amount of evidence.
Unfortunately, although the structure of the allegations may have lent itself to a
scattered analytical approach, such an arrangement does not provide the
opportunity for inclusion of much legal support, and, rather, it appears as though
Judge Matz provides mostly unsubstantiated assertions to support his positions.
123. Veoh IV, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70553, at *19.
124. Id. at *10.
94
20
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 4
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol21/iss1/4
THE FUTURE OF INVESTOR LIABILITY
control to yield contributory copyright liability, but it remains a
fact that should be discussed, not tossed away with a comparison
of Investor Defendants to computer display, storage, and software
companies, or "even utility companies that provide electricity to
the Internet."1 25
In his vicarious copyright infringement analysis, Judge Matz
concentrated on the lack of dividends or other direct financial
benefits to the Investor Defendants, taking as almost a given that
future returns on investment potentially derived from the sale of
the company were "too remote to constitute a 'direct' benefit from
the allegedly infringing activities of that company."1 26 However,
no cases were cited by the Court in support of this assertion.
Judge Matz merely stated that the case at bar was distinguishable
from cases like Napster and Fonovisa. Unfortunately, it is unclear
how the potential future sale of the company is any more remote a
financial benefit to Investor Defendants than the potential charging
of "fees for a premium or commercial version of its software" was
for Napster.'2 7
It is true that potential future benefits derived from increased
traffic perhaps resulting from infringing content is difficult to
measure, but a strong argument in logic could be made that, were
there no financial benefit to be derived, Investor Defendants would
not have knowingly allowed infringement to continue, thus
opening themselves up to litigation. As this case was only about
the liability of the investors and not about the infringing or
noninfringing nature of Veoh's content, it seems that little legal
harm would have been done in allowing Veoh's investors to
remain defendants under the vicarious liability theory. After all,
125. Id. at *19-20 (citing Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d
788 (9th Cir. 2007)). In Perfect 10, the Ninth Circuit rejected an allegation of
contributory liability for a credit card company that provided payment
processing services to alleged infringers, because "[a]ny conception of 'site and
facilities' that encompasses [such companies] would also include a number of
peripherally-involved third parties, such as computer display companies, storage
device companies, and software companies that make the software necessary to
alter and view the pictures and even utility companies that provide electricity to
the Internet." 494 F.3d at 800.
126. Veoh IV, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70553, at *26.
127. NapsterI, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 902.
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had Veoh been found secondarily liable for vicarious copyright
infringement,128 there would be a strong argument that Veoh's
investors-who apparently knew full-well about the infringing
activity,129 and logically expected to benefit from it-had the right
and ability to supervise through membership on the board of
directors, and chose not to stop the infringement.'3 0
Inducement to infringe copyright is the one theory of secondary
liability that plainly did not apply to the Investor Defendants.
Judge Matz strongly backed up his decision regarding this theory
with the clear precedent in Grokster that "only the one who
distributes a device can be liable under an inducement theory."'
UMG never alleged that any of the defendants, "as either investors
or board members, 'distributed' any device.""' However, of the
three theories of secondary (or in this case, tertiary) liability under
which the Investor Defendants were sued, only the decision
regarding Inducement to Infringe was strongly supported by law.
The contributory and vicarious infringement decisions were both
couched in somewhat ambiguous language and occasionally
questionable logic.
B. Policy
Nonetheless, as previously stated, Judge Matz reached the best
decision in this relatively unprecedented case. The public policy
128. Veoh was later granted summary judgment that it was entitled to the
section 512(c) safe harbor, and was thus free from liability. UMG Recordings,
Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., No. CV 07-5744 AHM (AJWx), 665 F. Supp. 2d
1099 (C.D. Cal. 2010)
129. "[I]n October 2006, Eisner, the principal of Tomante and its designee to
Veoh's Board, corresponded with Mark Cuban, owner of Landmark Theaters
and the Dallas Mavericks basketball franchise, about Veoh. Cuban pointed out .
. . in an email that the site had '[lots of potential, but you got a bunch of full
length movies up there. Im [sic] watching Tokyo Drift right now from
there....You saved me 20 bucks, but be careful."' Veoh IV, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 70553, at *9-10.
130. A question not reached by the court, "because the FAC failed to allege
that the Investor Defendants had a direct financial interest in the infringing
activities." Veoh IV, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70553, at *23.
131. Id. at *28.
132. Id. at *27.
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arguments that Judge Matz made at the conclusion of his opinion
are highly relevant, and strongly controvert a finding of tertiary
liability in cases such as Veoh. Two of the main policy arguments
espoused by Judge Matz regard maintenance of the sanctity of the
corporate form and derivation of societal benefits from "the vast
and rapid expansion of software technology in
telecommunications."' 3 Both arguments are determinative, and
should continue to drive the direction of legal development in
many areas of internet and technology law.
The first important policy reason that investor liability should be
precluded is the maintenance of the sanctity of the corporate form.
Of particular concern throughout the legal history of derivative
copyright liability has been the extent to which liability can
progress from the primary infringer to the business or businesses
that provide the context for the infringement. Historically, while
corporations have suffered the financial repercussions of legal and
contractual disputes, their investors have enjoyed a fair amount of
insulation from those same consequences.
Judge Matz cites "well-established concepts of corporate
governance" 34 in the conclusion of his analysis, but fails to
elaborate on the exact nature of those "well-established concepts,"
leaving future litigants without clear guidance.' A subsequent
reference to the corporate form leads one to deduce that Judge
Matz is referring to the limited liability afforded to corporate
shareholders, the exception to which is labeled "piercing the
corporate veil."
It is generally acknowledged that one of the most critical
features of corporate law is the safety net of limited liability,
which insulates a corporation's owners (its shareholders) from the
debts of the corporation beyond the value of their investment."'
"Piercing the corporate veil is the single exception to the limited
liability principle."' 37 Traditionally, it was thought that the rigid
133. Id. at *29.
134. Id. at *28.
135. Id.
136. Meredith Dearborn, Enterprise Liability: Reviewing and Revitalizing
Liability for Corporate Groups, 97 CAL. L. REv. 195, 198-99 (2009).
137. Id. at 199.
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legal rules of limited liability needed a safety valve to escape
unacceptable results and supervise limited liability, and so the
concept of piercing the corporate veil was born.'
Most states will disregard the corporate fiction of limited
liability and hold a shareholder liable for the debts of the
corporation only under a restricted set of circumstances.'39
Although the prongs of the piercing test vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, generally, the plaintiff must show that: (1) the
corporate shareholder exercised dominion or control over the
corporation, such that the separate personalities no longer factually
existed;140 and (2) the shareholder engaged in conduct that suggests
that, in the absence of piercing, an injustice will be perpetrated
using the corporate form.141
Veil piercing has been the subject of intense debate stemming
from the irregularity with which it is applied,'42 as well as its
benefits-which are key to policy arguments in decisions like
Veoh and should continue to be so in the formulation of future
copyright legislation. Such benefits include, most importantly in
the context of the internet, facilitation of capital formation. If
liability were not limited in cases like Veoh, "even a small
investment could render an investor liable for a substantial
corporate obligation," and investors would be reluctant to assume
the risk. 43
Maintenance of the sanctity of the corporate form is important
because without such protection from liability, investment-
138. Kurt Strasser, Piercing the Veil in Corporate Groups, 37 CONN. L. REv.
637, 640 (2005).
139. Dearborn supra note 136, at 203.
140. Note that, although the phrase "piercing the corporate veil" is never
used, a very similar test is applied by Judge Matz in determining if Veoh's
investors deserved liability for the alleged infringement of Veoh's copyrights.
141. See Dearborn supra note 136, at 204.
142. See id.
143. David Millon, Piercing the Corporate Veil, Financial Responsibility,
and the Limits of Limited Liability, 56 EMORY L.J. 1305, 1312 (2007);see also
Adam Lashinsky, The Boom is Back, FORTUNE, Apr. 19, 2006, available at
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortunearchive/2006/05/01/8375405/
index.htm (indicating that investors are already hesitant in the online market as a
result of the so-called 'dot-corn bust').
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especially the already-risky venture capital needed to fund internet
startups1"-will be chilled. Copyright holders pursuing secondary
parties, such as cash-poor internet start-ups, will often seek
injunctive relief. However, as here, if the opportunity presents
itself, those same copyright holders will turn to tertiary parties for
compensation.145 Granted, nothing prevents the copyright holder
from seeking compensation solely from secondary infringers or
seeking injunctive, rather than compensatory, relief from tertiary
parties, but the former seems more likely.146 For example, in the
context of the internet and "widespread infringement enabled by
cash-poor start-up companies, investors are more likely to have
deep pockets, and are therefore more likely to be pursued for
compensatory damages."l47
Exacting huge compensatory damages from investors in online
service providers would be detrimental to maintaining a national
policy that fosters innovation.148 In today's rapidly changing
technological environment, the United States is at clear risk of
losing its position as a leader in science and industry.14 9 Bipartisan
legislative history on the subject demonstrates an undeniable
Congressional intent to promote innovation in order for the United
States to stay competitive on a global scale.o
144. Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, Short-Term America Revisited? Boom
and Bust in the Venture Capital Industry and the Impact on Innovation, in 3
INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 17 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., MIT
Press 2003) ("[V]enture capital has emerged as the dominant form of equity
financing in the U.S. for privately held high-technology businesses.").
145. Benjamin A. Glatstein, Tertiary Copyright Liability, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
1605, 1634 (2004).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Gompers & Lerner, supra note 144, at 19 ("[V]enture funding does
have a strong positive effect on innovation. The estimated coefficients vary
according to the techniques employed, but on average a dollar of venture capital
appears to be three to four times more potent in stimulating patenting than a
dollar of traditional corporate R&D.").
149. See THE TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN INNOVATION, THE
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY: IS THE UNITED STATES LOSING ITS COMPETITIVE
EDGE? 1 (2005), available at http://www.futureofinnovation.org/PDF/Bench
marks.pdf.
150. See Task Force on American Innovation, http://www.innovation
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C. Future Directions
The importance of maintaining the corporate form for generating
capital, especially venture capital, combined with the stated and
necessary national policy of increasing and encouraging
technological innovation, is ample justification for Judge Matz's
decision in Veoh. However, the question remains: what now?
Public policy alone is not often a sufficient base upon which to
support judicial decisions, and can lead to any number of
unpredictable and irregular results in differing jurisdictions-or
even different judges in the same jurisdiction.
1. Potential Direction ofInvestor Liability Within Existing
Framework
Potentially, investors could require a declaratory judgment of
non-infringement before investing, but as Veoh shows, courts are
loath to grant such judgments in copyright infringement cases
without a very specific controversy to address."' It has further
been asserted that the requirement of a declaratory judgment
"would be an ideal response from an efficiency point of view";'52
however, it seems quite clear that this would be a most inefficient
solution from the courts' perspective-courts' already low desire
to grant a declaratory judgment in these types of cases' would be
taskforce.org (last visited Dec. 6, 2010) ("Innovation is central to American
jobs, competitiveness, and prosperity. ... It is the ability to innovate - to create
new high-value, high-margin goods and services - that sets a country, a state, or
a region apart. Investment in basic research is a critical component of
America's innovation system.").
151. See Veoh 1., 522 F. Supp. 2d 1265 (S.D. Cal. 2007).
152. Glatstein supra note 145, at 1633.
153. Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive
Intellectual Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 528-29 (2003)
("Declaratory judgments are relatively difficult to get because courts will not
issue advisory opinions. To establish an actual controversy that warrants a
declaratory judgment, a party must show that it has taken actions in preparation
for possible infringing conduct and that the IP owner has threatened the party
with an infringement suit. The threat must create a reasonable apprehension of
an infringement suit. Judges exercise substantial discretion regarding whether
they will accept a declaratory judgment suit; that discretion is reflected in the
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further antagonized by what could amount to daily requests by
startups seeking funding.
A convenient-and at first glance, ideal-solution would be to
inflict copyright liability only on such investors as would already
be susceptible to veil-piercing.'54 The problem, as previously
discussed, is that piercing the veil is no more an exact science than
the method already employed for determining copyright liability."'
If the policy is to avoid chilling innovation by discouraging
investment, replacing the current three theories of secondary
copyright liability with an older and more complicated but no less
unpredictable method of determining liability will not help the
situation. It does not appear that the current framework for
establishing tertiary copyright liability will be workable in the long
run, as it does not provide investors with any security regarding
the possibility of future litigation or the outcome of such litigation.
As development of online service providers continues to rise, lack
of security will be unfortunately demonstrated by a growing
number of unclear opinions that differ unpredictably between
jurisdictions.
2. Potential Changes to Existing Framework
Compelling arguments can be made in defense of investor
liability,' 6 but those arguments rarely, if ever, consider the
potential need for change in copyright law - either in substance or
in enforcement. That is, all arguments for investor liability rest on
a foundation of copyright law as it stands today, with no mention
of the direction copyright law may need to take in the future.
variable and fact-intensive treatment of the reasonable apprehension
requirement.").
154. In fact, the three theories of secondary copyright liability each contain
pieces of a 'piercing the corporate veil' analysis: for example, the 'right and
ability to supervise' requirement for vicarious copyright liability is fairly close
to the 'dominion or control over the corporation' requirement for veil piercing,
and as Judge Matz applied the factors to Veoh, it was plain that he intended not
to impose tertiary liability to the investors unless they were so attached to Veoh
that "separate personalities no longer factually existed." See supra pp. 2-5, 9.
155. See generally Dearborn supra note 136.
156. See Glatstein supra note 145.
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Perhaps, then, it is time once again for Congress to make some
changes to the existing framework, as it did with the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act in 1998.17 Congress could limit the
remedies that can be sought against investors and other tertiary
parties to mostly injunctive relief, unless there is a showing of bad
faith, in which case compensatory damages could be sought.'
It stands to reason that it would be to the benefit of society if
investors, service providers, and even websites that host infringing
content (but have substantial non-infringing use) were not
responsible for bearing the cost of constantly monitoring the
potentially infringing action of an increasingly tech-savvy
population with a steadily growing quantity of methods for
uploading infringing content.' Perhaps the real cost/benefit
analysis ought to be performed from the perspective of the
copyright holder. If the cost to the copyright holder himself is
greater than the benefit he derives from pursuing infringers, how
can a third party (or the venture capitalists that fund that third
party) realistically be expected to shoulder that cost? It is further
unrealistic to assert that if no one hosts infringing content, the
infringement will stop.
The "Pandora's Box" argument may seem evasive, and it is
certainly not a valid argument in every instance; however, cases
like Veoh highlight the practical impossibility of damming the
flood of user-generated content. That impossibility combined with
the sound policy of promoting innovation and the international
exchange of ideas and cultures to the benefit of all make this an
instance where Pandora's Box should be left open.
157. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE SUMMARY, THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM
COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1998 (1998), available at http://www.copyright.gov/
legislation/dmca.pdf.
158. Id.
159. See Mark Walsh, Forrester: Smartphone U.S. Market Share Reaches
17%, Media Post News, Jan 5, 2010, http://www.mediapost.com/publications/?
art aid=120085&fa=Articles.showArticle ("The proportion of adult U.S.
subscribers owning smartphones jumped to 17% last year from 11% in 2008 and
7% in 2007, according to new data from Forrester Research. The growth rate
has held steady from 2008 even as the user base has expanded . ... .).
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THE FUTURE OF INVESTOR LIABILITY
V. CONCLUSION
The UMG v. Veoh saga' highlights the fact that investors will
be targets in what is sure to be an ongoing trend of litigation in the
area of user-generated online content. The contributory, vicarious,
and inducement theories of secondary liability will continue to be
directed at these investors-technically tertiary infringers-with
varying results. While the decision in Veoh provides a relatively
weak legal model for future litigants in this area, the policy used to
guide the decision was sound, and, thus, the correct result was
achieved.
However, because policy is often open to varying
interpretations, it is important that Congress amend current
copyright law in order to create a stable, lower liability
environment for content-hosting sites, which are a necessary step
on current technological advancement, and the investors that make
such sites possible.
Such a reduction in the restrictiveness of copyrights would not
mean an end to authorial prosperity, but would rather be an
opportunity to profit in new ways, and would allow more freedom
for the investment that drives innovation. After all, it may be that
when Pandora gave in to her curiosity and finally opened the box,
all of the evils, ills, diseases, and burdensome labor that mankind
had not known previously escaped therefrom. However, it is said,
at the very bottom of her box, there lay hope.
Liz Brodzinski
160. See Veoh I, 522 F. Supp. 2d 1265 (S.D. Cal. 2007); Veoh II, 620 F.
Supp. 2d 1081 (C.D. Cal. 2008); Veoh III, No. CV 07-5744 AHM (AJWx),
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14955 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2009); Veoh IV, No. CV 07-
5744 AHM (AJWx), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70553 (C.D. Cal. May 5, 2009).
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